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Communication has become an increasingly discussed concept in postmodernity. 
While commentators agree on the value of the concept, there is a wide range of 
views on the consequences of the concept: Vattimo sees communication as heralding 
a new type of society based on transparency, I while Habermas sees communication 
as a form of action with the potential for emancipation. In this paper, I will be 
questioning the possibility of the latter: to do this I will first examine Nietzsche's 
views on communication; then I will examine Nietzsche's use of communication 
as a critique of consciousness; finally offer a critical analysis of Habermas's project 
of communicative action in the light of the Nietzschean critique of communication. 
The early writings of Nietzsche on language are chiefly concerned with rejecting 
the correspondence theory of truth and knowledge. On this account, the formation 
of the concept involves a process of eliminating differences and retaining what is 
common. This process is applicable both to things and to abstract ideas.2 
'We obtain the concept as we do the form, by overlooking what is 
individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms 
and no concepts, and likewise no species, but only with an X which 
remains inaccessible and undefinable for us' (Nietzsche 1873: 83). 
In effect, the concept is mistakenly said to represent the essences of things. 
However, accompanying this negative judgement of language is a positive thesis 
I. Vaffimo, (3. 1992. The Transparent Society,Cambridge: Polity Press. 
2. The application of Nietzsche's theory oflanguage to moral concepts is clearly shown in this passage 
from 'On Truth and Lying in an Extra Moral Sense': 'we call a person "honest." We ask, "Why did 
he act so honestly today?" Our answer usually goes: "Because of his honesty." Honesty! That 
means once more: the "leaf' is the cause of the leaves. For we know nothing of an essential quality 
called honesty: what we know are numerous. individualised. hence dissimilar, actions which we 
eQuate IIY omitrin!! the dissimilar and then referring to them as honest action. Last of all, we 
formulate out of them a gualitas occuita with the name "honesty" (249). 
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whereby an instrumentalist view of language is suggested. In the notes for the 
course on Ancient Rhetoric, Nietzsche specifies the necessity of language as a 
medium for communication, but refrains from elaborating on this thesis. Elaboration 
is found in the later works -specifically in The Gay Science - which, whilst still 
adhering to and presupposing the rejection of the representational function of 
language, shifts priority to the function of language as a medium of communication, 
an origin located in the need to ensure survival 
In describing language as a mode of communication, the early Nietzsche claims 
that prior to the development of verbal language we find that 'older than language 
is the mimicking of -est<es- which takes place involuntarily' (Nietzsche 1879:99). 
The 'mimicking of gestures' describes the process of non-verbal communication: 
the sensation felt by the individual is gesturally expressed with other individuals 
imitating these gestures and in so doing experiencing the same sensation 
The imitated gesture leads him who imitates it back to the sensation 
which it expressed in the face or body of the person imitated. That is 
how people leamed to understand one another: that is how a child 
still learns to understand its mother' (99). 
Nietzsche's account relies upon the assumption that there is a naturalistic relation 
between gesture and sensation: it is vulnerable to the charge analogous to that usually 
labelled as the problem of other minds. In this latter problem, it is argued that we 
cannot infer, on the basis of our mental states and physical actions, that the physical 
states and mental states of others are similar. In fact, it is claimed that we cannot 
even assume that they have mental states. Likewise, in the case of Nietzsche's 
argument, it is hard to accept that just by observing the physical behaviour of others, 
then they will experience the same sensations as we do. 
Language develops out of this primitive system of communication: the natural 
meaning of gestures is associated - conventionally with a particular sound: with 
time, the sound was understood without the need for the accompanying gesture. 'I 
mean a sign-language of sounds could be so agreed that at first one produced sound 
and gesture (to which it was symbolically joined), later only the sound' (100). The 
importance of Nietzsche's claim is that both language and communication are 
reduced to the level of sensation: both verbal and non-verbal language are ultimately 
an expression of the sensations of pleasure (what is useful) and pain (what is 
harmful). 
Nietzsche, Communication and the Possibility of Emancipation 41 
It is this pragmatic aspect of language which Nietzsche is concerned to show: 
within a life-threatening context, there is no question of interest in the nature of the 
world. Rather, philosophical considerations are outweighed by the necessity of 
communicating one's perception to the other. 'Language does not desire to instruct, 
but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance' (Nietzsche 1872-
74: 21). 
The condition of society is judged from the perspective of the way 
communication is used. Nietzsche opposes the communication of needs to the 
communication of knowledge as the framework for the analysis of society. This 
way of conducting a critique of society is elaborated upon in his essay on Wagner 
in Untimely Meditations. Language is 'sick' precisely because its original function 
has been replaced by another: instead of acting as a medium for the expression of 
human needs, language has developed as the expression of concepts. An 'unhealthy' 
society is one where language is used to express, 
the realm of thought - a realm diametrically opposed to that for the 
expression of which it was originally supremely adapted namely the 
realm of strong feelings - it has during the brief period of 
contemporary civilisation become exhausted through this excessive 
effort. Man can no longer express his needs and distress by means of 
language, thus he can no longer really communicate at all' (Nietzsche 
1876: 214). 
The decline of contemporary society, according to Nietzsche, is rooted in the 
development of language for something other than its original purpose. Authentic 
communication cannot take place because rather than the communication of feelings, 
the communication of ideas has been valorised. Men are alienated from each other 
since genuine communication no longer takes place, 'that is to say from a mutual 
agreement as to words and actions without a mutual agreement as to feelings' 
(Nietzsche 1878:237). 
But it is not a question as Hazelcroft argues of a conflict between language 
as the communication of feeling and language as the communication of thought 
originating in a 'fundamental tension within language itself' (Hazelcroft 1943 :56) . 
Instead, the question as to why is abused of is answered by referring to 
the shifting values of society, which places greater value on knowledge than on 
feeling. The personal communicative use of language has been transformed into 
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the impersonal communication of thoughts: this development brings about a lack 
of personal involvement between individuals towards each other. Instead of 
attempting to understand each other's feelings, on establishing interpersonal 
relations, understanding is linked to what can be known. 
The continuity of Nietzsche's thought on the necessity oflanguage as the medium 
for the communication of human needs and feelings is evident not solely because it 
is textually warranted throughout his writings, but crucially because it is the obverse 
of his epistemological critique. Thus whilst the origin of language is not related to 
establishing the truth of things but to the communication of dangerous situations, 
this necessity ensures that the possibility of misunderstanding must be reduced to a 
minimum. 'The greater the danger, the greater is the need to reach agreement quickly 
and easily as to what has to be done; not to misunderstand one another in situations 
of danger is an absolute necessity in human relations,' (Nietzsche 1886:186). 
Nietzsche's theory of communication links the intelligibility of language to its 
context. This is in fact one of the important claims put forward in the early Truth 
and Lie essay, where the establishment oflinguistic meanings is ultimately a question 
of conventional agreement grounded in the context of survival. Mutual understanding 
between speaker and listener are ultimately the goal of communication. The later 
Nietzsche specifies the relation between meaning and social context, adopting a 
reductionist account of meaning by arguing that in order to understand and 
communicate we need a situation where the same basic experiences are shared, 
'To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same 
words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same 
species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience 
in common. That is why the members of one people understand one 
another better than do members of differing peoples even when they 
use the same language' (Nietzsche 1886:14). 
The importance of this passage is that it brings out the role of language as the 
expression of the shared experiences (as opposed to purely individual ones) of a 
community. The emphasis on the social makes the claims put forward by some 
interpreters hard to accept. In his book Nietzsche and Political Thought Warren 
claims that Nietzsche's account of language would lapse into a private language if 
it became so particular that it would express purely individual needs, (Warren 
1991:56). This view is simply mistaken for it tails to acknowledge Nietzsche's 
Nietzsche, Communication and the Possibility of Emancipation 43 
explicit concern with the social aspect of language. The goal of language, according 
to Nietzsche, is that of communicating those needs which are common to all 
individuals within a particular society. 
Nietzsche's theory of communication is not only a general claim linking language 
to the context of its production, but a theory which specifies the relation between 
communication and context as one where the experiences which the community 
undergoes function as the crucial formative element in the production of language. 
The sharing of common experiential situations and their translation into language 
becomes the criteria which enables understanding to take place between different 
individuals within the same community. 
Nietzsche's view on the concept of communication is developed into a thesis 
concerning the relation between communication and consciousness. According to 
Nietzsche, communication is the necessary condition for the development of 
consciousness. By following this line of argument, Nietzsche re-values the view of 
man as a subject whose subjectivity is defined by consciousness: it is, in effect, a 
critique of Cartesian philosophy. 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche specifies: V consciousness has developed only 
under the pressure of the need for communicating (Nietzsche 1882: 298). The 
awareness of one's needs necessitates telling others about them: these needs originate 
in man's situation in a hostile environment where the likelihood of survival depends 
on the possibility of communicating his 'distress and to make himself understood' 
(298). Clearly, Nietzsche places communication as the basis of intersubjectivity: it 
is only because man is primarily a social being that consciousness develops as 'a 
net of communication between human beings' (298). Danto rightly points out that 
the individual with a sense of self comes into being only after his union into society: 
(Danto 980: 141-3); the identity of the individual as an individual and opposed to 
other individuals is the product of socialisation. Self-consciousness is the end result 
of the relationship between individuals in an environment which necessitates the 
possibility of articulating one's needs. 
The further development from consciousness to selfconsciousness results from 
having acquired language. The possibility of communication is not only directed 
externally but also internally: 'the human being inventing signs is at the same time 
the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only 
as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness' (Nietzsche 1882: 298). 
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Outside the human community the need for consciousness and consequently 
for language would not have arisen: man would have lived in a condition similar to 
that of animality, where actions are governed entirely by 'unconscious drives' 
(Nietzsche 1887:217). The transition from animality to that of humanity is 
characterised by the need to 'think, deduce, calculate, weigh cause and effect' (217). 
These functions are possible with the conscious, rational application of concepts. 
But whilst these activities are performed instinctively in the natural world, the 
socialised man performs them consciously so as to survive. 
It is precisely because these activities take on a linguistic form that their value 
is lost, 'the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this 
- the most superficial and worst part - for only this conscious thinking takes the 
form of words, which is to say signs of communication' (299). By showing that 
what is performed by consciousness can also be performed unconsciously, Nietzsche 
debunks the privilege of consciousness. The privileged status of consciousness is 
discredited because of its association with language.3 
There is an evident shift of emphasis in Nietzsche's theory of language and 
communication. The nature of language itself, irrespective of the type of 
communication, constitutes an impoverishment of life. Because the language of a 
community is related to the sharing of similar experiences within a particular 
environment, the experiencing of certain 'conditions oflife' provide the framework 
which generate the needs of the individual. The community is precisely the gathering 
of individuals with similar needs: 
now supposing that need has at all times brought together only such 
human beings as could indicate similar requirements, similar 
experiences by means of similar signs, it follows that on the whole 
the easy communicability of need, that is to say ultimately the 
experiencing of only average and common experiences' (Nietzsche 
1886:187). 
But this, in effect, constitutes for Nietzsche a diminution: the sharing of a 
3. The same point is repeated in the Will to Power: 'usually one takes consciousness itself as the 
general sensorium and supreme court; nonetheless, it is only a means of communication: it is 
evolved through social intercourse and with a view to the interests of social intercourse' (284). It 
is given that Nietzsche's point is to undermine the privileged status attributed to consciousness. 
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common language describes the loss of individuality. If communication implies 
mediocrity and consciousness is the product of communication, then conscious 
man is a mediocre being. It is clear therefore, that if consciousness is equated with 
language, and language is a product of the community, then 'whatever becomes 
conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, 
herd signal' (299-300). 
The type of community is intimately tied up with the language used in the 
community: because it expresses common needs, Nietzsche argues that it is 
characterised by 'herd' qualities. The consequences are negative: the 'subtle, select' 
individual tends to remain solitary on account of the difference between his 
experiences and needs from those of the 'herd'. The sharing of a common language 
in tum helps the 'herd' to promote itself: ultimately, Nietzsche claims, individuality 
is being lost at the expense of mediocrity. 
This view on the mediocrity of the herd is paralleled to the views on language. 
Ordinary language is described in Nietzsche with reference to a fundamental 
principle: 'every concept originates by the equation of the dissimilar' (Nietzsche 
1873:249). Nietzsche's assertion presupposes a radical nominalism such that each 
and every thing in the world is unique and individual; it is by negating what is 
particular that the condition of the possibility for the formation of the concept is 
met. The power of language is precisely that of operating a principle of identity, in 
so doing removing difference: things are postulated as identical precisely because 
the concept itself necessitates a selection of features of things which are merely 
similar but postulated as identical. It is man who sees things as similar in a world 
where difference reigns: language produces commonness both in the world, but 
also in society. 
The innovation of Nietzsche's thought is that of formulating the critique of 
consciousness from a linguistically derived position. The claims of the later writings 
represent a further development with the thesis of language as a communicatory 
medium for the expression of human needs coupled with the rise of consciousness. 
It is here that we can understand Nietzsche's valorisation of language as 
communication, for this supports his radical critique of the subject-object duality: 
this duality is mistakenly justified on the grounds that it is consciousness that makes 
us aware of this duality. Whilst the early texts offer a critique of epistemology 
suggesting communication rather than knowledge at the origins of language, the 
later writings suggest communication as the key to the critique of consciousness. 
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Nietzsche's critique of communication has further implications for 
postmodernism. The relationship between language and power is one of the dominant 
themes of discussions within postmodernism. Interestingly, for Nietzsche, power 
is the starting point for theory of language: in the early writings Nietzsche recognises 
Aristotle's insight that the human being has an inherent, natural 'power' to create 
signs.4 Clearly, he is not referring to political power as yet, but in the later writings, 
language itself becomes a product of the will to power, which in turn can be 
politically charged. It is in this respect that Nietzsche argues that language is value-
loaded and therefore its use for communication can never be neutral. Power and 
language are intimately connected. 
This idea finds resonance in the work of Lyotard: the narratives of the social 
legitimates its own power. Western civilisation has justified its practices by referring 
to a number of transcendental values inherited from the Enlightenment. These are 
what Lyotard calls the 'metanarratives' of history - the narratives of progress and 
freedom. In the contemporary world, Lyotard argues that the end of the 
metanarratives of western civilisation imply the decline of the justification of the 
western way of life and its imposition on others. Replacing the 'grand', universal 
narratives of the west, Lyotard points to 'mini', particular narratives: these are 
justified locally on social and historical grounds. 
What Lyotard points to - and which Nietzsche had already described in his 
theory of language, - is that language lost or more precisely never had any 
representational power. Clearly, from our study of the origins of language 'the 
construction of identical cases reminds us of the nature of the concept: the 'error' 
Nietzsche alludes to is the error of believing in a representational model oflanguage, 
i.e., believing that language grasps the essence of reality. This has been labelled as 
the crisis of representation: each language communicates the ideology of the 
dominant group as opposed to representing the world. Because all communication 
is ideologically slanted the act of communication is not neutral. 
The use of communicative action for emancipation is also suspect when Lyotard 
equates reason with power: with Adorno and Horkheimer, his understanding of 
reason is that of an instrumentality which makes emancipation impossible: 
instrumental reason expresses itself through language and representation. While 
instrumental reason had been acknowledged and was the object of critique in The 
4. See the Nietzsche'S lectures on rhetoric in 'Description of Ancient Rhetoric' p. 9. 
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Postmodern Condition, Lyotard elaborates on its concrete effects: 'reason and power 
are one and the same thing, Your may disguise the one with the dialectics or 
prospectiveness, but you will still have the other in all its crudeness: jails, taboos, 
public weal, selection, genocide' (Lyotard 1984:11). 
The starting point of Habermas' thinktng is his refusal to accept the renunciation 
of reason, the conclusion reached by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. In their analysis of modernity, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that 
instrumental reason had become the culminating element of the Enlightenment. As 
instrumental reason was described in terms of administrative efficiency, it had 
transformed the liberatory potential of the Enlightenment into a medium of 
oppression. 
The work of Habermas can be seen as an attempt at rerouting reason: while he 
acknowledges the prevalence of instrumental reason, his objection to Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Lyotard is that there are other forms of rationality. On the extent 
and critique of instrumental reason, Habermas is in full agreement with the critics 
of modernity: he is, however, unwilling to accept this dominance as inevitable. 
Accepting the view that reason functions within a means-end excludes the possibility 
of liberation. 
Habermas' strategy starts by relating different forms of reason to different forms 
oflife. In particular, his theory links communication with reason: in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas develops the view that the medium of 
communication -language - inherently allows for the possibility of a use of reason 
that does not aim at domination. Linguistic communication is structured according 
to what Habermas calls 'validity claims': every act of communication involves 
mutual understanding between speakers and listeners, which in turn consolidates 
the intersubjectivity of human relations (morality and justice), establishes a 
relationship with the external world (truth) and expresses the speaker's intentions 
beliefs or feelings (sincerity) 
Habermas makes it a point to differentiate between communication and 
communicative action: the latter presupposes the former but not vice-versa. It is 
because Habermas wants critIcal theory to be the instrument for social change that 
he lists four types of action: communicative action aims at mutual understanding, 
strategic action aims at instrumentality, normative actions aims at value-orientation 
and dramaturgical action aims at the presentation of one's self to others. 
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While communicative action takes place within the frameworK of linguistic 
communication, Habennas goes to great pains to establish the point that inherent 
in the very act of communication lies the possibility of mutual understanding, 'Our 
first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconslrainod 
consensust' (Habennas 1968:310). 
By using mutual understanding via communication as his starting point, 
Habennas is able to justify the critique of those fonns of communication that do 
aim at domination. Communicative action offers a model for the critique of 'distorted 
communication' : this type of communication is ideological in that it is a expression 
of the values or ways of thinking of particular social groups. Power and domination 
are the hallmarks of 'distorted communication' 
However, the question of whether communication leads to the possibility of 
emancipation in the way that Habennas describes it is highly debatable. It is on this point 
that Nietzsche's critique of communication becomes relevant: in describing language and 
its relation to the world, the question of power transforms itself across Nietzsche's writings. 
In Nietzsche's unpublished writings on rhetoric, the possibility oflanguage itself 
is described primarily as the 'power to discover and to make operative that which 
works' while the question of whom the power of language serves is alluded to as 
'to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance' (Nietzsche 1872-73: 
21). In rejecting the traditional theory of]anguage as picturing or corresponding to 
the world, Nietzsche theory emphasises the pragmatic dimension of language. 
And insofar as language serves a practical function, it has political implications: 
it is the powerful who create language so as to communicate and dominate 
effectively. Power and domination - not consensus - are inherent in communication, 
with the action desired as that of obedience. It is this point which Nietzsche specifies 
in The Genealogy of Morals, 
'the lordly right of bestowing names is such that one would almost 
be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an expression of 
the rulers' power. They say, "This is that or that"; they seal off each 
thing and action with a sound and thereby take symbolic possession 
of it ' (160). 
It is therefore difficult to accept Haberrnas's view. On his account communication 
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is a neutral medium which can be used either for liberation - communicative action 
or for domination - strategic action. But this is precisely what Nietzsche shows to 
be impossible: language can never be value-free as it is an expression of the prevalent 
ideological point of view. 
This in turn brings out another weakness in Haberrnas's account: Haberrnas 
tries to reconcile contradictory positions: on the one hand he wants language to be 
a medium for liberation while on the other hand, the same language serves as a 
medium for domination. But it is evident that language cannot be both at the same 
time. Communication is itself primarily 'distorted' or biased towards some position 
of power: it reveals the impossibility of the Haberrnasian project. 
The emphasis on communication in Nietzsche's theory oflanguage is linked to 
the critique of language insofar as it is intended to offset the valorisation of 
epistemology and consciousness in modem philosophy. The need to communicate 
is grounded within an existential situation where the possibilities of survival are 
maximised. While shifting towards intersubjectivity through the linguistic medium, 
Nietzsche points to an inherent difficulty which this brings about. So as to function 
as a medium of communication, language inevitably brings about with it an 
equalisation process which reduces difference to identity. The nature of 
communication is such that it detracts from the qualitative nature of experience. 
The act of communication is in itself a falsification of reality and is therefore non-
representationaL Nietzsche's anticipation of postmodemity is elaborated upon by 
Lyotard among others who describes postmodemity as the end of the belief in 
the representational power of language. By way of reaction to Lyotard, Haberrnas 
re-values communication as the tool for the 'thinking after' of postmodernity. In 
the light of the Nietzschean analysis, however, it seems that Haberrnas's optimism 
is unfounded. 
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